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INTRODUCTION 
We are in the midst of a revolution in financial markets, as 
cryptocurrencies based on blockchain technology promise a smart, 
decentralized, secure, and flexible means of conducting transactions. Since 
Bitcoin was introduced in 2009, cryptocurrencies have been steadily gaining 
in prominence and economic significance, shifting from fringe instruments 
linked to illicit drug marketplaces and money laundering1 to mainstream 
financial products used across the globe to store wealth, facilitate 
marketplaces, and provide platforms that support the development of new 
technologies. Bitcoin can now be readily converted to cash through a growing 
network of “Bitcoin ATMs,”2 can be hedged against using Bitcoin Futures 
that trade on derivatives markets,3 and is forcing major banks to adapt 
through direct investments in blockchain technologies4 and policies regarding 
the use of their funds in consumer cryptocurrency investments.5 
The year 2016 brought major changes to the cryptocurrency market, 
including the rise to prominence of utility-focused blockchain applications 
that offer greater functionality such as the operation of smart contracts.6 The 
most prominent of these, Ethereum (and its currency “Ether”), has become the 
second most widely traded cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of 
approximately $53 billion (as compared to Bitcoin’s $117 billion) as of June 2018.7 
 
1 See Zoë Bernard, Everything You Need To Know About Bitcoin, Its Mysterious Origins, and the Many 
Alleged Identities of Its Creator, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 2, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-12#heres-what-we-know-about-satoshi-nakamoto-
for-sure-14 [https://perma.cc/RM6P-G8D9] (noting that a digital currency was shut down by the government 
in 2007 for money laundering). 
2 See Hiawatha Bray, Instant Bitcoins—At a Price, BOS. GLOBE (July 6, 2017), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/07/05/instant-bitcoins-price/LHo7nc95clgnfGZvIAypeP/
story.html [https://perma.cc/E8RU-QD97] (reporting that, as of 2017, over 800 ATMs in the United 
States allowed a user to convert cash into bitcoin). 
3 See, e.g., Now Available: Bitcoin Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/
bitcoin-futures.html [https://perma.cc/S5WT-WNNY] (offering the opportunity to trade in Bitcoin futures). 
4 See Tamlin Magee, Bitcoin and Beyond: Which Banks Are Investing in Blockchain?, TECHWORLD 
(Feb. 22, 2018), http://www.techworld.com/picture-gallery/business/bitcoin-beyond-how-banks-are-
investing-in-blockchain-technology-3625324 [https://perma.cc/7GDP-3FAW] (reporting that numerous 
banks are investing in blockchain technology, including J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup, which have 
invested in the technology to track credit-default swaps). 
5 See Jennifer Surane & Laura J. Keller, Bitcoin Ban Expands Across Credit Cards as Big U.S. Banks 
Recoil, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2018, 11:32 AM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/
bofa-to-decline-all-cryptocurrency-transactions-on-credit-cards [https://perma.cc/Y9RT-N3UA] (naming 
multiple banks that will decline credit card purchases of cryptocurrencies due to the riskiness 
of this instrument). 
6 For a recent overview of smart contracts, see generally Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart 
Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (2017). 
7 Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP, http://coinmarketcap.com 
[https://perma.cc/4B9X-P9UG] (last visited June 12, 2018, 5:26 AM UTC). 
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Around this time the industry also saw the rise of Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICOs), funding mechanisms that resemble a hybrid of crowdfunding and 
venture capital (VC) financing, in which a set number of “coins” or “tokens” 
in a new crypto venture are offered for sale to the public. Individuals can then 
buy in using fiat currency or other cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether. 
While in 2015 an exceptionally successful ICO might have raised only a few 
million dollars, in 2016 ICO raises of $150 million or more began appearing,8 
conducted by what were essentially seed-stage companies that would have 
been unlikely to raise more than a few million dollars from venture capital 
firms or angel investors (the typical fundraising sources for such companies).9 
In 2017, total ICO funding topped $3 billion, exceeding the total amount of 
VC investment in early stage Internet companies for the year.10 
However, despite the meteoric rise of ICOs as the funding method of 
choice for cryptocompanies, ICOs have been afflicted by a number of 
problems, including regulatory hurdles, fraudulent activity, and negative 
public perception. While reliable estimates are lacking, informed observers 
have repeatedly warned that many ICOs are fraudulent;11 with nothing but “a 
swanky website and an official-looking whitepaper,”12 dozens of ICOs have 
 
8 See Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-icos/#6c12de045670 
[https://perma.cc/R2BJ-B49B] (reporting on the increase in capital raised via ICOs between 2015 and 
2017). The first raise of this size was conducted by The DAO, which raised $150 million in a few days but 
was later plagued with legal issues when the SEC ruled its coin to be a security. See infra Section II.A. 
9 Barnett, supra note 8. To further exemplify the magnitude of ICO fundraising, the fifty largest 
ICOs of all time have raised an average of $59 million. Id. Yet this is typically the first major fundraising 
event for these companies; for example, none of the three largest ICOs (FileCoin, Tezos, and EOS) 
had raised more than a seed round prior to their ICOs, which raised over $220 million on average. 
Block.one, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/block-one [https://perma.cc/
G48G-MMRN] (last visited Aug. 5, 2018); Filecoin, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/
organization/filecoin [https://perma.cc/YC5X-SG2F] (last visited Aug. 5, 2018); Tezos, CRUNCHBASE, 
http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/tezos [https://perma.cc/2APT-YYQH] (last visited Aug. 5, 2018). 
10 See Jillian Harris, Andrew M. Ray & Elizabeth H. Baird, SEC Steps on the Gas To 
Deter Fraudulent ICOs, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=146023e6-57b1-4056-944a-993da08c9fc2 [https://perma.cc/7X2W-YGG4] (stating that 
funding via ICOs has surpassed this more traditional fundraising method, while warning that this 
emerging asset is encountering increased attention from the SEC). 
11 See, e.g., Louise Matsakis, Cryptocurrency Scams Are Just Straight-Up Trolling at This Point, 
WIRED (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/story/cryptocurrency-scams-ico-trolling 
[https://perma.cc/7QWL-KKGB] (outlining a pattern of cryptocurrency-based scams); Top Blockchain CEOs 
Say Many ICOs Are Fraudulent, PYMNTS (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.pymnts.com/blockchain/bitcoin/
2017/ripple-ethereum-execs-on-fraudulent-icos [https://perma.cc/8SPF-GX5A] (reporting that a cofounder 
of Ethereum and the CEO of Ripple, another major cryptocurrency, have warned about fraudulent ICOs). 
12 Matsakis, supra note 11. Whitepapers are instruments used to describe crypto projects to the 
public and typically discuss the technology and product to be developed, the founders’ goals and 
projected milestones, and the structure of the organization. Crypto Tips, Learning Crypto: 
Understanding White Papers, MEDIUM (Nov. 17, 2017), http://medium.com/@blockchainchick/
learning-crypto-understanding-white-papers-3c2ccdc3eb91 [https://perma.cc/4BLL-6UB4]. 
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raised money for what have later turned out to be Ponzi schemes or fake 
companies whose owners steal the money and disappear.13 There are a number 
of factors that have contributed to these concerning circumstances. The 
decentralized nature of the technology means that large amounts of money 
can flow through ventures without a central financial institution present to 
act as a guarantor.14 The targeting of ordinary people, rather than 
sophisticated VC firms or wealthy individuals,15 means that few investors have 
the expertise or the financial incentive to engage in costly due diligence to 
ensure the veracity of a firm’s claims. The absence—until very recently—of 
significant regulatory oversight has meant that the ICO process is largely 
nonstandardized, giving firms significant latitude to include false or 
misleading information in their investment solicitation materials or to omit 
important information. Finally, the frothiness of the cryptomarket has meant 
that investors have at times been willing to accept significant risk of being 
defrauded in return for the potential for astronomical returns.16 
 
13 See Matsakis, supra note 11 (reporting that companies like Prodeum, OneCoin, and Confido 
were based in fraud). Cryptocurrency companies are also frequent targets of hackers; according to 
a recent analysis by Ernst & Young, ten percent of the money raised through ICOs so far has been 
stolen or has disappeared. Id. 
14 See Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, In Blockchain We Trust, MIT TECH. REV. (April 9, 2018), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/610781/in-blockchain-we-trust [https://perma.cc/EUM4-D4YP] 
(“What makes a blockchain a special kind of ledger is that instead of being managed by a single centralized 
institution, such as a bank or government agency, it is stored in multiple copies on multiple independent 
computers within a decentralized network.”). While blockchain technology’s self-verification mechanisms 
are one of its central characteristics, reducing fraudulent behavior in the system and supposedly obviating 
the need for centralized institutions, they do little to address the potential for fraud in the ICO process 
itself. For example, blockchain technology is not capable of assessing the veracity of a company’s claims 
regarding its technology or the soundness of its financial and governance structures. In other words, 
while blockchain technology does a good job of ensuring that coins sent from point A will safely arrive 
at point B, it does not ensure that once the company receives its ICO funds, it will follow through with 
the claims in its marketing materials or will not simply take the money and disappear. 
15 Regulatory scrutiny of ICOs has recently intensified. See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
In response, some law firms have begun to recommend that companies offer tokens only to accredited and 
non-U.S. investors in order to take advantage of safe harbors within the federal securities laws, such as Rule 
506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933. How Private Placement ICOs Are Beginning To Explode, 
IBC GRP. (Sept. 6, 2018), http://ibcgroup.io/how-private-placement-icos-are-beginning-to-explode 
[https://perma.cc/968Z-E94W]. While this significantly changes the nature of the ICO transaction, making 
it look more like a typical syndicated VC financing, it does not prevent uninformed “mom and pop” 
investors from later purchasing these tokens through a secondary market. 
16 See Wolf Richter, 3 Charts Show the Crazy Gains of Cryptocurrencies, BUS. INSIDER (May 15, 
2017, 8:39 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-price-compared-to-other-cryptocurrencies 
[https://perma.cc/JE3J-RNJR] (discussing the rapid growth in the value of cryptocurrencies since 
2015); Steve Stecklow, Alexandra Harney, Anna Irrera & Jemima Kelly, Chaos and Hackers Stalk 
Investors on Cryptocurrency Exchanges, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:00 AM GMT), http://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/bitcoin-exchanges-risks [https://perma.cc/AQ9Q-A3GX] (“These exchanges, 
which match buyers and sellers and sometimes hold traders’ funds, have become magnets for fraud and 
mires of technological dysfunction, . . . posing an underappreciated risk to anyone who trades digital coins.”). 
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Since mid-2017, the SEC has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance in 
regulating ICO activity, including announcing a new Cyber Unit—whose 
roles include combating “[v]iolations involving distributed ledger technology 
and initial coin offerings”17—and bringing a number of enforcement actions 
against companies for securities fraud and unregistered offerings of 
securities.18 There has been significant uncertainty as to whether cryptoassets 
like coins and tokens19 actually qualify as securities and are therefore subject 
to SEC oversight. In a July 2017 enforcement against an organization called 
The DAO, the SEC articulated its view that tokens with strong equity-like 
characteristics are in fact securities,20 but did not extend its analysis to more 
borderline cases such as utility-based coins.21 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has 
taken a broad view of what qualifies as a security, opining that “[b]y and large, 
the structures of initial coin offerings that I have seen promoted involve the 
offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the securities registration 
requirements . . . of our federal securities laws.”22 However, it remains to be 
seen exactly what types of coins or tokens will be caught in the SEC’s dragnet. 
Given the current state of the ICO market—fraught with fraudulent 
activity, lacking in industry norms and best practices, and regulated by an 
 
17 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to 
Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/9P3N-G9AS] [hereinafter SEC Announces Enforcement]. 
18 See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 10 (recapping the SEC’s enforcement action against AriseBank 
based in allegations that the company made false claims, committed fraud, and made an unregistered 
security offering); John Reed Stark, Which ICOs Are Next to Get Caught up in the SEC’s ICO 
Dragnet?, D&O DIARY (Dec. 12, 2017), http://www.dandodhiary.com/2017/12/articles/cyber-liability/
guest-post-icos-next-get-caught-secs-ico-dragnet [https://perma.cc/LQ7B-FYY2] (summarizing two 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC against cryptocurrency companies after creation of the 
Cyber Unit). 
19 Note that the terms “coin” and “token” have slightly different meanings. See Ray King, Token 
vs Coin: What’s the Difference?, BITDEGREE, http://www.bitdegree.org/tutorials/token-vs-coin 
[https://perma.cc/F52K-W564] (last updated Aug. 20, 2018) (“[C]oins are native to their own 
blockchain[, w]hilst tokens have been built on top of another blockchain.”). However, for the 
purposes of this Comment, I use the two terms interchangeably. 
20 See DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 WL 7184670 (July 25, 2017) (finding that 
DAO tokens are securities, in part because DAO token holders’ rights were “akin to those of a 
corporate shareholder”); see also Ryan Clements, Is an ICO a Sale of Securities? An Analysis of 
The DAO Offering, FINREG BLOG (Aug. 24, 2017), http://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/08/24/
is-an-ico-a-sale-of-securities-an-analysis-of-the-dao-offering [https://perma.cc/X8RZ-EZSN] (summarizing 
the SEC’s report as indicating an ICO will be considered a security based on certain conditions, including 
“the significance of promoters, managerial and gatekeeping functions, voting and information rights, the 
nature of control of an enterprise, the potential for profit, and the impact of secondary exchanges”). 
21 See Clements, supra note 20 (noting that the overall impact of the DAO decision on the ICO 
market is unclear, particularly because the SEC did not discuss app tokens, utility tokens, privacy 
currency tokens, use-or-lose tokens, or potential future tokens). 
22 Public Statement, Jay Clayton, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Chairman, Statement on 
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
statement-clayton-2017-12-11#_ftnref4 [https://perma.cc/QZ58-GMGW] [hereinafter Clayton]. 
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incomplete and highly uncertain regulatory framework—there is significant 
latitude for alternative regulatory influence from what I term 
“pseudoregulators”—nongovernmental bodies who exert regulatory influence 
over an industry by nature of their relationship with that industry rather than 
by any statutorily granted authority. For example, stock exchanges such as the 
NYSE promote industry best practices through rules and listing requirements, 
which were particularly important prior to the creation of the SEC in 1933.23 
An entity with one of the greatest potentials for exerting pseudoregulatory 
influence on the ICO market is the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurer. 
D&O insurance aimed specifically at cryptocompanies only became available 
beginning in early 2018, and the available coverage options are extremely 
limited.24 The development of a more robust and accessible market for this 
insurance could play an important role in altering the characteristics of ICO 
companies.25 D&O insurers have played a well-documented role in regulating 
the risky activities of their insureds and of their target markets more generally 
through measures like underwriting criteria, risk-based pricing, intelligent 
contract design, and engagement with education and public regulation.26 In the 
ICO context, the availability of D&O insurance—an important risk-reducing 
measure for a company’s managers and shareholders—could prompt firms to 
comply with insurers’ underwriting and pricing criteria, thereby moving 
towards more standardized and legitimate corporate activities that would 
promote the long-term success of the financial technology industry. 
 
23 The NYSE’s higher level of scrutiny could perhaps also help to explain why NYSE companies are 
the subject of fewer securities class action lawsuits than NASDAQ companies. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS—2017 YEAR IN REVIEW 33 (2018), http://www.cornerstone.com/
Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2017-YIR [https://perma.cc/W8TC-M3ME]. It is 
worth noting that the effectiveness of the NYSE at self-regulation has appropriately been questioned in 
recent years. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis et. al., The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure 
of Self-Regulation, 7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102, 145-48 (2010) (emphasizing that self-regulation leads to players 
acting in their own self-interest and having conflicting goals in arguing that self-regulation is ineffective). 
24 See ICO Seeking D&O? Here’s What You Need To Know!, GB&A INS., http://www.gbainsurance.com/
ICO_DandO_Need_To_Know_218 [https://perma.cc/BM2G-88YW] [hereinafter ICO Seeking D&O?] 
(characterizing the D&O insurance landscape for ICOs as elusive and stating that five or fewer insurers will 
offer coverage); see also Garrett Koehn, D&O for ICO?, LINKEDIN (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/do-ico-garrett-koehn [https://perma.cc/D7MZ-S5LX] (noting the difficulties in offering D&O 
insurance for ICOs, particularly the risky nature of ICOs). 
25 I use this term loosely to denote companies that are planning an ICO in the near future or 
who have recently undergone one. 
26 See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers 
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1419-20 (2013) (noting that insurers encourage the 
insured to operate in a less risky manner by factoring riskiness into price; underwrite, collecting 
information to assess risk and decide whether or not to insure an entity; and add limits, deductibles, 
coinsurance terms, and carveouts to contracts to limit the transfer of liability from the insured to the 
insurer); see generally TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: 
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010) (reporting the 
results of an empirical analysis of D&O insurers’ role in shareholder class action securities lawsuits). 
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This Comment will proceed as follows. In Part I, I begin by discussing 
securities liability and the D&O insurance that covers it in the context of traditional 
public corporations that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO). 
In Part II, I apply these concepts to cryptocompanies that are considering 
doing or have recently undergone an initial coin offering (ICO). I first examine 
whether cryptoassets like coins and tokens are even subject to securities 
regulations, then proceed by discussing what types of liability a post-ICO company 
might be subject to and which individuals affiliated with such a company could 
be targeted for such liability. 
Finally, in Part III, I apply concepts from traditional D&O insurance as 
well as cyber insurance to the ICO context, examining how D&O insurance 
for post-ICO companies might function. Specifically, I examine four ways 
that insurers could have a positive impact on the structure and governance of 
the ICO industry. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE ANALOG: LIABILITY AND 
INSURANCE FOR IPO COMPANIES 
Because an ICO is the initial offering of a security-like instrument to the public, 
an IPO is the most analogous transaction for which there is sufficient information 
on the attendant legal risks. Therefore, despite marked differences in the 
mechanisms by which ICOs operate as compared to previously available funding 
methods, it is useful to first examine the IPO to gain a baseline understanding of 
the liability and insurance issues attendant to this type of transaction. 
Shareholder litigation represents the most significant source of D&O risk to 
public corporations.27 In 2017, 8.4% of public companies listed on the NASDAQ 
and NYSE were the subject of securities class action lawsuits,28 with average 
market capitalization losses of $667 million from such suits.29 The most 
prevalent liability provisions in these suits are Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Rule 10b-5”), and sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (“section 11” and “section 12”); roughly half of the 2017 filings 
contained allegations related to these provisions.30 Collectively, these provisions 
provide private rights of action that can be asserted against a seller of securities 
for false or misleading representations or material omissions related to the 
purchase or sale of securities. More specifically, sections 11 and 12 impose strict 
 
27 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 494 (2007) (“For public 
corporations . . . the dominant source of D&O risk . . . is shareholder litigation.”). 
28 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 10. 
29 Id. at 39. This represents a landmark year for total number of filings, with a 52% increase 
over 2016 and “more than double the 1997–2016 average.” Id. at 1. 
30 Id. at 9-10. 
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liability on an issuer of securities for misrepresentations or omissions made in 
securities registrations,31 prospectuses, and oral statements32 related to the sale,33 
while Rule 10b-5 is a catchall antifraud provision that is more broadly applicable 
but is also more difficult to prove.34 Furthermore, section 12(1) provides a cause 
of action for the solicitation or sale of unregistered securities in violation of 
section 5 of the Securities Act (“section 5”),35 which prohibits the sale of any 
security “unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security.”36 A 
variety of parties can be held liable under section 11, including not only the issuer 
but also the directors of the issuer, every person who signs the registration 
statement, experts who certify or help prepare the registration statement (for 
their relevant portions), and the security’s underwriters.37 Under section 12, any 
person who offers or sells a security in violation of the section can be held liable, 
including both issuers and underwriters.38 Furthermore, section 15 of the 
Securities Act and section 20 of the Exchange Act (“section 15” and “section 20”) 
impose secondary liability on persons who “control”39 the acts of those found 
liable under sections 11 and 12 and any provision of the Exchange Act (including 
Rule 10b-5), respectively.40 This means liability can in some cases be extended 
to a variety of people, such as controlling shareholders, directors, and creditors.41 
While firms and their directors and officers always face some risk of 
securities-related liability,42 this risk is greatly magnified following major 
 
31 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
32 Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
33 See PAUL VIZCARRONDO, JR., WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, LIABILITIES UNDER 
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 27, 42-44 (2014) (defining the liabilities created by sections 11 and 12). 
34 See id. at 62 (“In general, to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant (1) made a false statement or an omission of material fact, (2) with scienter, (3) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied, and 
(5) which proximately caused (6) the plaintiff ’s economic loss.”). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1). 
36 Id. § 77e(c); see also VIZCARRONDO, supra note 33, at 42 (noting that, under section 12(1), 
offering or selling an unregistered security creates liability). 
37 VIZCARRONDO, supra note 33, at 27-28. 
38 Id. at 44-45. 
39 ”Control” means “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the 
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting 
securities, by contract, or otherwise.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2017). 
40 VIZCARRONDO, supra note 33, at 140. 
41 See id. at 141 (stating that the unclear breadth of the term “control” means the potential reach 
of liability can include these groups if they have sufficient power of influence). 
42 See Kevin LaCroix, Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The 
Basics, D&O DIARY (July 23, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/07/articles/d-o-insurance/
executive-protection-indemnification-and-do-insurance-the-basics [https://perma.cc/R6XC-SVCV] 
(“Claims are regularly brought against corporate officials on a wide variety of legal theories, 
including, for example, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty or of securities law violations.”). 
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transactions such as mergers and IPOs.43 This is especially true when the 
transaction at issue did not initially produce a favorable result, or where an initially 
promising result led to poor financial performance in the following months.44 Due 
to this peak in risk so early in a new public company’s life, many companies first 
purchase a D&O policy around the time of their IPO45 while others shift from a 
private company policy to a public company policy, bringing significant 
differences in the scope of coverage.46 It is the new public company policy that is 
responsible for covering the liability risk associated with the IPO itself. 
D&O insurance policies typically contain three types of coverage: 
coverage for directors and officers of the corporation for losses arising from 
shareholder litigation (“Side A” coverage); coverage for the corporation in the 
event that it is required to indemnify its directors or officers for such losses 
(“Side B” coverage); and coverage for the corporation for losses related to the 
corporation itself being named as a party in shareholder litigation (“Side C” 
coverage).47 Companies typically purchase all three types of insurance 
together in a package; it is rare that they would purchase only one type of 
coverage.48 D&O insurance typically covers damages awards, settlement 
amounts, and attorneys’ fees related to the litigation.49 There are three main 
 
43 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 22 (“[N]ewer public companies are subject 
to securities class actions more frequently than their larger, more established counterparts in the 
S&P 500 Index.”). 
44 For example, Snap and Blue Apron were both recently named in securities class action suits 
following the release of disappointing first-quarter financials. See Jon Hill, Snap Hit with Investor 
Suit Claiming Misleading Metrics, LAW360 (May 17, 2017, 1:49 PM EDT), http://www.law360.com/articles/
925088/snap-hit-with-investor-suit-claiming-misleading-metrics [https://perma.cc/WVV8-XKQ6] 
(reporting that Snap Inc. was sued by investors claiming its registration statement contained 
misleading information meant to inflate the company’s valuation); Sophia Morris, Blue Apron Hit 
with Stock Drop Suit After IPO, LAW360 (Aug. 21, 2017, 3:39 PM EDT), http://www.law360.com/
articles/955728 [https://perma.cc/SK9W-TJDK] (reporting on suit brought against Blue Apron two 
months after its IPO based on claim that the company was aware its financial performance would not 
match the statements in its registration statement and prospectus). 
45 Just over half of private companies reported buying D&O insurance in 2016, CHUBB, 2016 
PRIVATE COMPANY RISK SURVEY D&O RISKS AND RISK MANAGEMENT (2016), 
http://www2.chubb.com/US-EN/_Assets/doc/2016-07.22-Private-Co.-Survey--NA-DO-Infographic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A597-XR7D], compared to “well over 90%” of public corporations. Sean J. 
Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2006). 
46 See Joseph D. Jean & Janine M. Stanisz, Insurance 101: Private Companies Need Directors’ and 
Officers’ Insurance Too, 27 INS. COVERAGE LITIG., May 2, 2017, at ii (stating that D&O insurance 
bought by private companies is often more comprehensive than the coverage public companies have). 
47 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 27, at 499 (defining these three categories of coverage). 
Note that “D&O insurance” refers to all three types of coverage, despite the fact that Side B and 
Side C coverage reimburse the corporation directly rather than its directors and officers. 
48 See Griffith, supra note 45, at 1168 (noting that “corporations buy insurance packages” rather 
than a single type of coverage). 
49 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 27, at 500 (listing losses typically covered by D&O insurance). 
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exclusions from coverage, the most significant being claims involving fraud 
or personal enrichment by the insureds.50 
II. MAPPING ONTO THE ICO CONTEXT 
While considering a company’s liability risk following an IPO is helpful 
in developing concepts that can be applied in the ICO context, there are still 
significant gaps that need to be addressed. To date there have been only a 
handful of ICO-related class action lawsuits, which began to arise in late 
2017;51 almost all of these are still pending.52 While these suits will no doubt 
be illuminating should they go to trial, it may be some time before there is 
any substantive clarity on how these cases will be handled. 
This Part will address several open questions that are important in 
determining the nature of shareholder litigation for ICOs. First, I will 
examine which types of cryptoassets actually qualify as securities, and are 
therefore subject to SEC oversight. Second, I will apply concepts from the 
IPO realm to examine what types of liability companies are likely to face 
following an ICO. Third, I will explore the parties that could potentially face 
liability, which varies based on the governance structure of a given company. 
A. Do Digital Coins/Tokens Qualify as Securities? 
In order for an ICO to be subject to the federal securities laws, it must 
qualify as a sale or offer of securities. To date, almost every ICO-related class 
action lawsuit has alleged a violation of section 5,53 which prohibits the offer 
and sale of unregistered securities.54 Section 11, also alleged in ICO lawsuits, 
 
50 The excluded conduct is “often defined as a ‘dishonest or fraudulent act or omission or any 
criminal act or omission or any willful violation of any statute, rule or law.’” Id. (quoting EXECUTIVE 
RISK INDEMNITY, INC., BROAD FORM DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE 
§ III(A)(3) (1996)). Other typical exclusions include claims that existed prior to the start of the 
policy and litigation among two or more insureds. Id. at 500-01. 
51 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 6 (“In the second half of the year, a new 
phenomenon emerged. There were five class actions related to initial coin offerings, or ICOs, of 
cryptocurrencies.”). 
52 A search on Westlaw for “Initial Coin Offering” revealed only two class action suits with 
some kind of judgment: Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., No. 17-06850, 2018 WL 656012 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 1, 2018) and MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., No. 17-07095, 2017 WL 6513439 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017). Both are related to the Tezos ICO that occurred in July 2017. 
53 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); see, e.g., Class Action Complaint for 
Violation of Sections 12(a)(1) & 15(a) of the Sec. Act of 1933 at 4, Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, No. 
17-10001 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017), 2017 WL 6547557 (alleging that the ATB ICO violated section 5); 
Class Action Complaint for Violation of Sections 12(a)(1) & 15(a) of the Sec. Act of 1933 at 3, Rensel 
v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 6367991 (alleging that the Centra 
ICO violated section 5). 
54 Section 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1), provides a private cause of action to anyone who 
purchases a security that was sold in violation of section 5. 
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prohibits false or misleading statements made in securities registration 
statements.55 Therefore, a company can effectively circumvent the federal 
securities regulation if it is able to successfully claim that its coins or tokens 
are not securities. This topic has already been described in a number of 
publications;56 my goal here is to summarize what information currently 
exists and to introduce a new heuristic for evaluating a given coin or token. 
A security is defined as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond . . . [or] investment contract.”57 Cryptocurrencies 
that embody aspects of securities run the risk of being classified as investment 
contracts, which are (1) investment(s) of money (2) in a common enterprise 
(3) with a reasonable expectation of profits (4) to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others (the “Howey test”).58 In July 
2017, the SEC provided us with its first detailed guidance regarding the 
application of this definition to cryptocurrencies in its Report of 
Investigation of The DAO.59 The DAO had issued “DAO Tokens” in an ICO 
that raised $150 million worth of Ether to create what was essentially a 
decentralized venture capital fund.60 The DAO Tokens allowed the holders 
to “earn profits by funding projects that would provide [them] a return on 
investment,” and to vote on which projects the fund should undertake.61 The 
cofounder of the company backing the ICO compared the tokens to “buying 
shares in a company and getting . . . dividends.”62 Following the four prongs of 
the Howey test, the SEC concluded that the DAO Tokens were in fact securities. 
First, purchasers of the tokens had invested money through their exchanges of 
Bitcoin and Ether; “money” can include other sources of value beyond cash.63 
Second, the investors had a reasonable expectation of profits, as the project was 
 
55 VIZCARRONDO, supra note 33, at 27. 
56 See, e.g., Clements, supra note 20 (discussing the ambiguity of the SEC’s DAO decision, 
particularly that it is unclear exactly what will make a coin qualify as a security and how a company 
can avoid its coin being subject to federal securities law); John Reed Stark, The SEC and ICOs: Winter 
is Coming, D&O DIARY (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/11/articles/securities-laws/
guest-post-sec-icos-winter-coming [https://perma.cc/WHT5-DQFW] (noting that some ICO companies 
admit their tokens are securities while others attempt to distinguish their tokens from securities). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 77b. 
58 See DAO, supra note 20, at 11 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)). This 
definition is also known as the Howey test. 
59 Id. at 11; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report 
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2017-131 [https://perma.cc/8ZL7-C6WS] (reporting that the SEC found the 
DAO Token to be a security subject to federal securities laws). 
60 See DAO, supra note 20, at 3-6 (describing the structure of The DAO as “allow[ing] for 
voitng by investors holding DAO Tokens” on the “funding of projects that would provide DAO 
Token holders a return on investment”). 
61 Id. at 5-6. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. at 11. 
222 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 211 
constructed to generate returns that would be distributed to its token holders 
periodically.64 Third, these profits were to be derived from the managerial 
efforts of others, because token holders “had little choice but to rely on” the 
expertise of The DAO’s Curators—the central personnel responsible for 
“monitoring the operation of The DAO, safeguarding investor funds, and 
determining whether proposed contracts should be put for a vote.”65 
While the SEC’s findings were illuminating in some respects, the fact that the 
DAO Tokens closely emulated the characteristics of traditional corporate stock 
made this case rather clear cut. It remains much less clear whether coins that lack 
these equity-like characteristics are in fact securities. I would like to introduce a 
framework for considering the issue that categorizes cryptoassets into four types:66 
coins that operate as digital stores of value, much like a traditional fiat currency 
(StoVaCoins);67 coins whose value is tied to the value of another asset such as gold 
or the U.S. dollar (StableCoins);68 coins that function like securities by providing 
ownership interest in some common enterprise (EquiCoins);69 and coins that 
provide additional network utility either by acting as digital “gas,” which can 
 
64 See id. at 11-12 (“[T]he various promotional materials . . . informed investors that The DAO 
was a for-profit entity whose objective was to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.”). 
SEC chairman Jay Clayton commented: 
It is especially troubling when the promoters of these offerings emphasize the 
secondary market trading potential of these tokens. Prospective purchasers are being 
sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value – with the ability to lock in those 
increases by reselling the tokens on a secondary market – or to otherwise profit from 
the tokens based on the efforts of others. These are key hallmarks of a security and a 
securities offering. 
Clayton, supra note 22. 
65 DAO, supra note 20, at 12-13. “The central issue is ‘whether the efforts made by those other 
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect 
the failure or success of the enterprise.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 
F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
66 This framework is borrowed from an excellent Steemit article: Basiccrypto, Is Your Crypto 
Digital Gold, Gas, or Something Else?, STEEMIT (Aug. 2017), http://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/
@basiccrypto/is-your-crypto-digital-gold-gas-or-something-else [https://perma.cc/S4SL-8SZ7]. 
67 Examples of StoVaCoins are Bitcoin and Litecoin. These coins only have value to the extent that 
the market agrees they do and are willing to accept them as payment for goods and services or in exchange 
for other assets. They do not provide any additional utility beyond the storage and transfer of wealth. 
68 For example, Tether is a currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, the euro, or the yen. TETHER, 
http://tether.to [https://perma.cc/MR2L-KPQ5] (last visited June 27, 2018). 
69 The DAO Token is one example. See supra notes 58–65 and accompanying text. Another 
example is Protostarr, a company that issues coins allowing investors to sponsor online content 
creators and receive a portion of the profits creators receive from that content. This company 
voluntarily shut down after a call from the SEC shortly after The DAO report was released. 
See Laura Shin, After Contact By SEC, Protostarr Token Shuts Down Post-ICO, Will Refund 
Investors, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2017, 2:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/01/
after-contact-by-sec-protostarr-token-shuts-down-post-ico-will-refund-investors/#3b06612c192e 
[https://perma.cc/D7SN-YZER] (reporting that Protostarr refunded the money it had collected in 
its ICO after the SEC began investigating the company). 
2018] Securities Liability and Role of D&O Insurance in Regulating ICOs 223 
be used to build new blockchain-based applications or execute tasks such as 
smart contracts,70 or by providing access to a distributed resource such as 
remote computing power71 or file storage72 (UtiliCoins). 
It is apparent that StoVaCoins and StableCoins are highly unlikely to be 
classified as securities given their strong currency-like characteristics, and it is 
equally apparent (especially after The DAO ruling) that EquiCoins are 
securities; the major open question is the classification of UtiliCoins. SEC 
Chairman Jay Clayton has expressed his view that simply adding utility to an 
otherwise equity-like coin should not safeguard it from regulation.73 That being 
said, it remains to be seen how broadly courts will interpret the Howey test’s 
“reasonable expectation of profits derived from the . . . efforts of others.”74 
It will be difficult to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the investors 
in a UtiliCoin ICO expected profits via an appreciation in the coins’ value, 
whether they merely purchased the coins for their utilitarian characteristics, or 
whether their motive was a combination of the two. The SEC has indicated 
that the type of marketing and publicity statements made by companies in 
describing their tokens is likely to have a material impact on whether investors 
in a subsequent ICO have a reasonable expectation of profits.75 UtiliCoins are 
a rather unique asset class in that their nature is dual purpose (both utility and 
speculation), and unlike investments in other dual-purpose assets such as real 
 
70 The typical example of a “gas” UtiliCoin is Ether, which allows users to execute smart 
contracts and create new applications and cryptocurrencies based on the Ethereum blockchain by 
paying a fraction of one Ether for each transaction. See Basiccrypto, supra note 66 (calling Ether 
“the prototypical UtiliCoin”). 
71 For example, Golem. GOLEM, http://golem.network [https://perma.cc/7X7J-K5M9] (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
72 For example, Storj and SiaCoin. DECENTRALIZED CLOUD STORAGE—STORJ, http://storj.io 
[https://perma.cc/N7UM-KUCU] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); SIA, http://sia.tech [https://perma.cc/
8MPK-UC4M] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
73 See Clayton, supra note 22 (“[C]ertain market professionals have attempted to highlight 
utility characteristics of their proposed initial coin offerings in an effort to claim that their proposed 
tokens or coins are not securities. Many of these assertions appear to elevate form over 
substance. Merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does not 
prevent the token from being a security.”). 
74 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
75 See Clayton, supra note 22 (“Tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing efforts 
that emphasize the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others 
continue to contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Company Halts ICO After SEC Raises Registration Concerns (Dec. 11, 2017), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-227 [https://perma.cc/2PYX-WFSX] (citing its belief that the 
fact that Munchee Inc. “emphasized that investors could expect that efforts by the company and others 
would lead to an increase in value of the tokens” and that “it would take steps to create and support a 
secondary market for the tokens” indicated that investors had a reasonable expectation of profit). 
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estate, the distributed and easily divisible nature of UtiliCoins allows holders 
to readily realize either the coins’ utility or their profit-generating ability.76 
Furthermore, it is uncertain, in the context of decentralized organizations like 
The DAO, what constitutes profit that is generated “from the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others.”77 In its section 21(a) Report of Investigation, the 
SEC opined that conducting a variety of activities such as marketing, maintaining 
a website and forums, and proposing profit-generating investment opportunities 
for the pooled funds was sufficient to satisfy the last prong of the Howey test.78 
B. What Potential Liability Does a Company Conducting an ICO Face? 
The SEC has indicated that ICOs for coins with strong securities-like 
characteristics will be regulated in much the same way as IPOs, meaning an 
offeror will need to either register as a public offering of securities or seek a 
valid exemption such as Regulation D.79 If the offering is made to the general 
public and is unregistered, a section 5 claim is the easiest target for potential 
plaintiffs, as section 12(1) provides that those who issue securities in violation 
 
76 To expand upon the real estate analogy, consider an agreement between a number of 
investors to purchase several houses. Based on the form of the contract, it will be easy to infer 
whether the purpose of buying these houses is speculation, or whether the investors intend to live 
in the houses. With digital assets like UtiliCoins, however, it is impossible to discern each user’s 
intent in purchasing the coins, because a user may at his whim expend the coins for his utilitarian 
value or sell the coins to generate profit. 
77 DAO, supra note 20, at 11. A DAO, or Decentralized Autonomous Organization (which The 
DAO made itself out to be), is “a business or organization whose decisions are made electronically 
by a written computer code or through the vote of its members. In essence it is a system of hard 
coded rules that define which actions an organization will take.” Universa, Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization—What Is a DAO Company?, MEDIUM (Nov. 28, 2017), http://medium.com/
universablockchain/decentralized-autonomous-organization-what-is-a-dao-company-eb99e472f23e 
[https://perma.cc/VLJ4-544C]; see also Laura Shin, ICOs: Why People Are Investing In This $380 
Million Phenomenon, FORBES (May 16, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/
05/16/icos-why-people-are-investing-in-this-380-million-phenomenon/#5a6bb1c111a1 [https://perma.cc/
5R8V-LFRE]. 
78 DAO, supra note 20, at 12. Interestingly, The DAO did not succeed in becoming truly 
decentralized—a German corporation and a network of hand-picked curators were ultimately 
responsible for most of the business decisions. Theoretically, if an organization were to become truly 
decentralized by resting ultimate authority with its token holders and giving them full information 
rights, any profits generated might no longer be considered “derived from” the efforts of the centralized 
managers. It is also unclear, however, whether investors would be able to exercise a meaningful amount 
of control, even with adequate voting rights, when their ownership interests are widely dispersed. 
79 Many companies are now using Rule 506(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2017), to conduct their 
ICO, which exempts the offering from most registration requirements so long as it is only made to 
accredited investors (as defined by 17 C.F.R. § 230.501), who receive securities that cannot be sold for 
at least six months without SEC registration. Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html [https://perma.cc/NC6E-J62D] 
(last updated Nov. 27, 2017). 
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of section 5 are strictly liable,80 meaning the plaintiff need only show that the 
coin was a security and that he purchased it. The remedy in this case is 
generally rescission: the plaintiff returns his coins and is refunded his 
purchase price plus interest.81 At a class action scale, this liability is likely to 
be ruinous, especially for a company whose coins have declined in value since 
its ICO. Rule 10b-5 and section 12(2) are also available to plaintiffs when the 
offering is unregistered, providing a cause of action for false or misleading 
statements or omissions of material fact related to the offering.82 ICOs that 
have been registered with the SEC will likely be subject to the same liability 
provisions as IPOs, as discussed in Part I above. 
Even if an issuer in an ICO may believe that its coin is not a security, this 
will not necessarily dissuade costly nuisance suits alleging violations of section 5. 
Furthermore, while the federal securities laws are the primary framework for 
analyzing legal issues in ICOs, even in cases where the coins are clearly not 
securities (such as those involving StoVaCoins or StableCoins), a variety of state 
law causes of action may still apply, such as blue sky laws and state fraud laws.83 
Finally, in the current regulatory climate, the threat of enforcement 
actions from the SEC or others is omnipresent.84 In many cases, the effect of 
such an action is similar to a lawsuit—the company is required to shut down 
and return all of its investors’ money. 
C. Which Parties May Face Liability Following an ICO? 
The first step in identifying the relevant actors with respect to D&O 
insurance is to determine who is at risk of liability following an ICO. In the 
case where a legitimate U.S. corporate entity, with managers and a board of 
directors, is the sole entity conducting the ICO, the answer is simple: as with 
IPO liability, risk falls to the corporation and its D&Os, as well as others 
 
80 VIZCARRONDO, supra note 33, at 44. Note, however, that this cause of action still subject to 
certain caveats and defenses. See id. at 44-45. 
81 Id. at 50. 
82 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
83 Lindsay Lin, Why ICOs Should Want To Be Securities, COINDESK (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:05 UTC), 
http://www.coindesk.com/icos-want-securities [https://perma.cc/D8AY-KH54]. These causes of action 
are important because they would prevent a fraudulent “nonsecurities” ICO from evading responsibility. 
However, they have not frequently been invoked in ICO suits and enforcement proceedings to date. 
84 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
the Department of Treasury, and the IRS each claim jurisdiction over certain aspects of cryptocurrency 
companies’ activities, though an analysis of each regulator’s jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. See Francine McKenna, Here’s How the U.S. and the World Regulate Bitcoin and Other 
Cryptocurrencies, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2017, 11:19 AM ET), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
heres-how-the-us-and-the-world-are-regulating-bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-2017-12-18 [https://perma.cc/
2RV7-LX3S] (summarizing extent to which each regulator in the United States and abroad has 
authority to regulate cryptocurrencies). 
226 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 211 
involved in the transaction such as experts, underwriters, and “controlling 
persons.”85 Unfortunately, this situation is far from the reality for many ICOs, 
which are often conducted by organizations structured in nontraditional ways, 
such as supposedly “decentralized organizations” or as collections of 
individuals, corporate, and noncorporate entities.86 In these cases, courts and 
the SEC have determined on a case-by-case basis who the true principals who 
control the conduct of the enterprise are. 
First, there have been a number of ICOs conducted by unincorporated, 
decentralized, or unincorporated and decentralized entities. For example, The 
DAO, or “decentralized autonomous organization,” attempted to structure 
itself as a truly decentralized entity whereby its token holders not only owned 
the company, but exercised managerial control over the entity’s assets as a 
collective.87 As discussed in Section II.A, The DAO was not successful in 
truly decentralizing its governance structure, due to the presence of 
centralized parties who retained meaningful control over the entity’s 
managerial decisions. Furthermore, regardless of whether true post-ICO 
decentralization is accomplished by a given entity, it seems doubtful that such 
a group of individuals could adequately disperse responsibility in order to 
avoid being targeted for liability. After all, some legal entity is generally 
required to perform the mechanical functions of the ICO, such as marketing, 
distributing tokens, and receiving funds (or other cryptocurrencies) in 
return.88 Even if the subsequent project was developed by a widely dispersed 
group of contributors, akin to open source software development, the initial 
“sponsoring” parties could still be held liable for violating the securities laws. 
In the case of The DAO, a German corporation named Slock.it wrote and 
deployed the necessary code on the Ethereum blockchain, launched a website 
to promote and provide information about the offering, solicited media 
attention, and created and updated online forums.89 To purchase DAO 
 
85 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
86 The decentralized nature of ICOs as a funding mechanism means that a collective action problem 
disincentivizes individual investors from conducting adequate due diligence, allowing companies with 
highly questionable governance and ownership structures to raise large amounts of capital. 
87 Clements, supra note 20; see also Shin, supra note 77 (“People call them companies, and the 
analog in the traditional world is a company, but they’re really not companies. . . . [I]t’s best to think 
of them as decentralized autonomous organizations where there’s an entrepreneur and founding 
team but no legal entity . . . I really think of these structures as [I]nternet tribes. . . . They’re 
collections of people from all over the world that own a token and have ownership in a product and 
want to bring a token to the world.”). 
88 It is certainly possible that we will eventually reach a state of technological development at 
which these functions could be conducted automatically—that is, without human input. While we 
currently have methods of smart contracting that can automate certain aspects of the ICO process, 
such as the exchange of a currency (like Bitcoin or Ether) for the tokens being offered, we are far 
from being able to truly automate the process from start to finish. 
89 DAO, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
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Tokens, investors were required to send Ether to The DAO’s Ethereum 
Blockchain address, which was initially set up by Slock.it.90 Thus, despite 
Slock.it’s attempts to hide behind the idea of a “decentralized” entity, the facts 
made it clear that Slock.it was in fact responsible for The DAO’s ICO. 
Sponsoring entities like Slock.it can be held liable for their participation in 
a third party’s issuance of securities via the common law doctrine of participant 
liability, which states that the entity can be held liable “if the injury to the 
plaintiff flowed directly and proximately from [its] actions,” meaning that its 
“acts were both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales transaction.”91 
In the case of Slock.it, making this showing would be trivial since The DAO 
itself was essentially a shell entity prior to the ICO and thus Slock.it undertook 
all relevant steps to prepare and conduct The DAO’s ICO.92 
Finally, examining two other prominent ICOs, which were conducted by 
nontraditional entities and subsequently entangled in legal difficulties, will 
help clarify who is at risk of liability when an ICO organization consists of a 
collection of several individuals and legal entities. The PlexCorps ICO, which 
was conducted by a combination of three different legal entities and two 
natural persons, was shut down in the SEC’s newly established Cyber Unit’s 
first enforcement action.93 According to the report, PlexCorps “marketed and 
sold securities called PlexCoin on the [I]nternet to investors in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, claiming that investments in PlexCoin would yield a 1,354 percent 
profit in less than 29 days.”94 In its motion for preliminary injunction against 
PlexCorps alleging violations of section 5 and Rule 10b-5, the SEC alleged 
that “PlexCorps, PlexCoin, and/or Sidepay are subject to suit, inter alia, as 
‘unincorporated organizations’ under [s]ection 2(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act.”95 The SEC also named individuals Lacroix and Paradis-Royer, of whom 
the latter was the “sponsor and principal shareholder of an entity known as 
Sidepay Limited, incorporated in the United Kingdom.”96 The SEC was able 
to tie Sidepay and these individuals to PlexCorps via bank records, email, and 
physical addresses.97 Lacroix and Paradis-Royer argued that “PlexCorps was 
 
90 Id. at 6. 
91 SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 650 (9th Cir. 1980). 
92 Indeed, in its Report of Investigation on The DAO, the SEC devoted only one paragraph to 
proving this point. See DAO, supra note 20, at 16 (“Moreover, those who participate in an unregistered 
offer and sale of securities not subject to a valid exemption are liable for violating [s]ection 5.”). 
93 SEC Announces Enforcement, supra note 17. 
94 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam (Dec. 
4, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-219 [https://perma.cc/N4C9-PCCE]. 
95 Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Defendants at 2, SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17 Civ. 
7007 (CBA) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (emphasis omitted). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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not a suable entity, but rather a concept name,”98 and therefore no action 
could be brought against it. The court promptly granted the preliminary 
injunction against PlexCorps, apparently accepting the SEC’s argument that 
it was in fact a suable entity.99 
Similarly, the Tezos ICO, which raised $232 million worth of Bitcoin and 
Ether (the second-largest ICO to date) was conducted by a Delaware 
corporation (Dynamic Ledger Solutions), a Swiss nonprofit foundation 
(Tezos Foundation), and a husband and wife pair (the Breitmans).100 The 
internal governance structure of these entities was messy, to say the least: 
according to the class action complaint filed against Tezos, it was unclear at 
the time who was actually controlling the Foundation due to infighting among 
the Breitmans and the head of the Foundation’s board of directors. The plan 
for the Tezos ICO was to raise funds via the Foundation, which would then 
acquire Dynamic Ledger Solutions, which held all the Tezos-related 
intellectual property. However, the specific terms of this acquisition were not 
disclosed to investors, and the acquisition was not required to take place until 
up to three years following the launch of the “Tezos Network,” which had no 
specified date.101 Furthermore, by the time the complaint was filed, the 
Breitmans were already alleged to have personally received tens of millions in 
cash.102 Due to the vast sum of money at stake and egregiousness of the terms 
of this ICO, several plaintiffs have since filed class action lawsuits103 (which as 
of March 2018 have been consolidated into one action) that name Dynamic 
Ledger Solutions, the Foundation, and the Breitmans as defendants.104 
The takeaway from these two cases is that both the SEC and courts are 
willing to look past entity boundaries and legal formalities to identify the 
principal actors responsible for an ICO. While there is, to date, no specific 
 
98 Id. 
99 SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17-7007, 2017 WL 6398722, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) (“The 
Commission likely will establish that [PlexCorps] participated in a scheme to obtain more than $15 
million in proceeds from unlawful activities related to ‘PlexCoin Tokens,’ which are investment 
contracts subject to the Securities Act and Exchange Act.”). 
100 Class Action Complaint at 4-6, Gaviria v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-01959 (M.D. 
Fla. Nov. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 5713392. 
101 Id. at 13; see also id. at 15 (“The TEZOS ICO Terms for Investors purport to require agreement 
from the investors that, despite the investors’ investments, TEZOS might not allocate to the investors 
any Tezzies when the TEZOS network is created, TEZOS might not create any Tezzies at all, any 
Tezzies created might be useless or valueless, and TEZOS has the right to abandon all efforts to develop 
and release the TEZOS network—all while retaining the investors’ invested funds and assets.”). 
102 Id. at 18. 
103 GGCC, LLC v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-06779, 2018 WL 1388488 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 16, 2018); Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-06850, 2018 WL 656012 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
1, 2018); MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-07095, 2017 WL 6513439 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
20, 2017); Class Action Complaint for Violations of Sections 12(a)(1) and 15(a) of the Sec. Act of 
1933, Okusko v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-06829 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017). 
104 GGCC, LLC, 2018 WL 1388488, at *6. 
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information on what legal theories courts will use to tie the various entities 
together—for example, “controlling person” liability,105 participant liability,106 an 
agency relationship, or some kind of corporate syndicate107—it is fairly certain 
that they will take a broad view of who can be pulled into this type of litigation. 
III. THE CASE FOR D&O INSURANCE FOR ICO COMPANIES 
As discussed in Part I above, D&O insurance is critical to both private 
and public companies’ ability to manage risk, especially in an IPO situation. 
ICO companies would certainly be interested in purchasing D&O insurance 
given the riskiness of their industry108 if it could be done at a price and on 
terms that make economic sense. At the same time, the cryptocurrency industry 
represents a new market opportunity for D&O insurers, who have shown 
themselves willing to enter high-risk markets in the past.109 As of mid-2017, 
D&O insurance for ICO companies was practically nonexistent, leaving these 
companies with few risk-management options.110 In the intermittent months, 
despite the regulatory turmoil, a small number of options have materialized,111 
though the scope of the available coverage appears to be quite limited.112 
However, insurers who have entered the cryptomarket are currently enjoying 
 
105 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
107 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966) (“The individual defendant is 
charged with having ‘organized, managed, dominated and controlled’ a fragmented corporate entity . . . .”). 
108 See Karen Boto, Cryptocurrencies - To Insure or Not To Insure?, CLYDE & CO. (Aug. 29, 2018), 
http://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/cryptocurrencies-to-insure-or-not-to-insure [https://perma.cc/
482U-JSGH] (“Many start-ups are raising funds digitally via Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and are 
consequently looking for cover for ICO related risks.”); Kevin LaCroix, Cryptocurrencies and ICOs: 
Problems and Promise, D&O DIARY (Nov. 5, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/11/articles/cyber-liability/
cryptocurrencies-icos-problems-promise [https://perma.cc/TUM6-F6CL] (“It would be far too easy for 
D&O underwriters to . . . simply put a blanket prohibition on ICOs. However, the fact is that there is a 
business opportunity here, and . . . there is interest among the principals involved in ICOs for the kind of risk 
management protection that D&O insurance provides.”). 
109 For example, insurers who cover cybercrime and data breach liability. See infra notes 147–51. 
110 See, e.g., Koehn, supra note 24 (“Raising capital increases liability, so those offering an ICO 
might have an interest in insurance. Insurance companies may also wish to offer coverage as a new 
market emerges. Nevertheless, at least for now, offering true D&O insurance that covers claims 
deriving from an ICO is unlikely . . . .”). 
111 See ICO Seeking D&O?, supra note 24 (“While coverage may be elusive, there are a handful of 
carriers willing to provide coverage . . . as in 5 or less. The marketplace may however expand slightly 
in the near future as insurers appear to be slowly and cautiously exploring this space.”); Brian H. 
Mukherjee, Insurance for Cryptocurrencies: Tips for Maximizing Coverage, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP (Jan. 
16, 2018), http://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2018/01/01_16_18-insurance-for-cryptocurrencies 
[https://perma.cc/4DBD-KUMK] (“[W]e are cautiously optimistic that options will increase as more 
insurers enter the market. . . . [However, p]erhaps the most challenging type of coverage to obtain in 
the cryptocurrency space is [D&O] insurance.”). 
112 See ICO Seeking D&O?, supra note 24 (stating that the handful of available policies tend to 
have high premiums, exclude Side C coverage, and carry large deductibles and aggressive exclusions). 
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“annual premiums [that] reportedly gulf those offered to other businesses for 
similar covers,”113 indicating that there is sufficient appetite for insurance from 
cryptocompanies to support these premiums. As the ICO market continues to 
develop and become less risky, insurance companies are in a unique position to 
wield their influence as pseudoregulatory institutions to impose legitimizing 
and stabilizing features onto the market. This Part will begin by discussing 
generally the means by which D&O insurers can potentially influence the 
conduct of their insureds and prospective insureds, and the degree to which 
they have been successful in doing so. Subsequently, Sections A through D will 
examine in more detail four potential mechanisms—underwriting criteria, 
risk-based pricing, contract design, and education and risk management—and 
how they might apply in the context of ICO insurance. 
To begin, there is strong evidence to suggest that insurance companies are 
able to exert a regulatory influence on the industries they insure.114 The 
incentives for the insurer are simple: once they have underwritten a risk, it is 
in their best interest to take measures to reduce the magnitude of that risk. 
This leads to insurers engaging in loss prevention activities such as “advising 
clients on how to modify behavior to avoid losses”115 and engaging in research 
and education to identify industry best practices.116 Furthermore, the economics 
of insurance serves as a deterrent to risky behavior. Insurers respond to riskier 
activities by being less willing to insure at all (underwriting criteria), by charging 
higher premium amounts (risk-based pricing), and by including contractual 
terms in their policies that limit the magnitude and quality of the risk that the 
 
113 Boto, supra note 108. Note also that companies’ willingness to pay substantially inflated premiums 
indicates they may also be willing to take other governance-related measures demanded by their insurers. 
114 See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 2 (“D&O insurers . . . will have an 
opportunity to influence corporate conduct through the insurance relationship[,] . . . [including] 
through underwriting, monitoring, and the settlement of claims.”); Baker & Swedloff, supra note 26, 
at 1418 (“[I]nsurers manage the moral hazard of insurance, and hence . . . control or regulate their 
insureds.”); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 213 (2012) (“[I]nsurers on occasion can provide public regulators 
with legislative blueprints to achieve society-wide improvements in risk reductions.”); Shauhin 
Talesh, A New Institutional Theory of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 617, 625 (2015) (“[T]he 
insurance field’s institutionalized logics and political mobilization mediate and, at times, influence 
what law and compliance mean among private organizations, but they also shape the content and 
meaning of legislation, regulation, and court decisions.”); Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, 
and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 417, 428 (2018) [hereinafter Talesh, Data Breach] (“[C]yber insurance—through the 
risk management services that come with the insurance—provides a pathway for insurance 
institutions to gain influence over organizational decision making relating to compliance issues 
surrounding data breach and privacy.”). 
115 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 26, at 1422. 
116 Id. at 1422-23. 
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insurer will bear (contract design).117 The latter three mechanisms form the core 
of D&O insurance’s regulatory influence in the corporate context.118 
However, at least in the context of publicly traded corporations, the 
empirical evidence indicates that insurers have limited success in managing 
their insured’s risk through the mechanisms described above, for a number of 
reasons.119 Though insurers attempt to price on the basis of risk, they do not 
feel that they are accurately able to do so.120 They do not generally require their 
prospective insureds to commit to any particular loss-prevention activities, nor 
are they willing to provide discounted premiums for doing so.121 They are also 
not generally successful in providing any kind of ex ante loss prevention 
services, primarily because agency costs between a corporation’s managers and 
shareholders render its managers essentially indifferent to “all but the most 
extraordinary securities class actions.”122 Insurers’ most effective tool for 
managing their insured’s risk is the structure of insurance contracts: large 
deductibles ensure that companies retain the incentive to control costs in the 
event of suit; caps on the amount of coverage available expose companies to 
potential liability in the event of serious securities fraud (involving large dollar 
amounts); and exclusions for a final adjudication of (intentional) fraudulent 
behavior prevent reimbursement for criminal conduct.123 
Yet despite the mixed results with publicly traded corporations generally, there 
is good reason to think that insurers will have significantly greater ability to regulate 
the cryptocurrency industry. The current paucity of D&O insurance options in this 
market means that, unlike in the traditional corporate context, those insurers who 
do offer policies wield considerable power.124 This will greatly increase insurers’ 
ability to implement the core aspects of their regulatory toolkit—underwriting 
criteria, risk-based pricing, and contract design. The fact that the cryptocurrency 
industry is so new and lacking in best practices will further empower ICO insurers 
to engage in activities like risk prevention services, research, and education. 
 
117 Id. at 1419-20. 
118 Id. at 1424-26. 
119 Id. at 1424. 
120 See id. (“[T]here is substantial evidence that insurers are not very confident about their ability 
to price on risk given that the pricing differentials are small in relation to the insured liabilities.”). 
121 Id. at 1424-25. 
122 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 126. Once a company is sufficiently covered by D&O 
insurance, neither its managers nor the company itself is likely to face much, if any, liability as the 
result of “ordinary” securities fraud. Therefore, even though it may still be in the shareholders’ best 
interest to reduce the probability of suit through ex ante loss prevention, the managers have little 
incentive to take efforts to do so. 
123 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 26, at 1425-26. Actual fraud, which generally requires scienter 
(intent to defraud), should be distinguished from general securities fraud, in which companies are 
strictly liable for false statements which may have been made mistakenly. 
124 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing how insurers have had enough market 
power to demand much higher premiums for cryptocompanies than for companies in other industries). 
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A. Underwriting Criteria 
First, insurers will much more easily be able to impose strict underwriting 
criteria on their insureds. In contrast to traditional D&O insurers, whose 
market is sufficiently crowded and clients are so large that the insurers have 
little power to demand engagement in loss-prevention activities, ICO insurers 
wield significant power over their prospective insureds. Put simply, a company 
that doesn’t appreciate a prospective insurer’s underwriting criteria cannot 
bring its business elsewhere. Furthermore, given the high degree of legal and 
regulatory uncertainty in the cryptocurrency market, would-be insureds have 
a strong need for insurance while insurers are hesitant to enter the market. 
These lopsided incentives have made insurance covering ICOs a valuable and 
scarce commodity, giving insurers the ability to adopt a take-it-or-leave-it 
approach to their underwriting criteria.125 This is perhaps the ICO insurer’s 
best tool for steering the ICO market in a positive direction. 
This raises the question—what kinds of preconditions for coverage should 
ICO insurers demand? Certainly, there are a number of factors that are 
fundamental to sound governance practices that cryptocurrency companies 
could adopt relatively easily. For example, U.S. based insurers could require 
that all operations and fundraising activity (including the ICO) be conducted 
through a single Delaware corporate entity, just as U.S. based venture capital 
firms typically require of the startups they invest in.126 This simple condition 
would vastly reduce the legal and regulatory uncertainty brought about by 
operation in foreign jurisdictions. Insurers could seek to eliminate the chance 
that a company’s ICO is alleged to be an unregistered securities offering by 
requiring that it either register its coins as securities with the SEC or seek a 
no-action letter ruling that the SEC does not consider its coin to be a security. 
At the very least, insurers should require that companies seek a formal opinion, 
written by experienced legal counsel, as to whether their coins are securities.127 
Additionally, insurers could require certain preconditions that would 
reduce the likelihood of fraudulent or questionable behavior, which is still a 
 
125 See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 78 (“[I]f insurers refuse to cover very high risk 
corporations . . . then these firms must either change their practices or go uninsured.”). 
126 See, e.g., Murray A. Indick, Flip Transactions: Taking Your Startup from Europe to the U.S., 
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (June 22, 2016), http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/
flip-transactions-taking-your-startup-from-europe-to-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/D4BE-QXFT] 
(“Although not impossible, raising money from U.S. investors as a foreign business is problematic 
because U.S. venture capitalists generally only invest in U.S. companies, where they are familiar 
with the legal and regulatory regimes and market norms.”). 
127 See ICO Seeking D&O?, supra note 24 (“Outside of actually registering the ICO, providing 
a legal opinion to the underwriters is often the most persuasive at alleviating insurers’ concerns.”). 
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major concern for investors.128 For example, they could require that the 
company demonstrate its ability to succeed as a venture, such as having staff 
with sufficient domain expertise, detailed business plans, and a viable product 
or substantial progress toward one.129 This type of due diligence is more along 
the lines of what a venture capitalist might undertake, though at a lower degree 
of detail; the purpose is simply to ensure that the company will not crash and 
burn (or simply disappear) shortly after its ICO, triggering massive liability.130 
B. Risk-Based Pricing 
Second, insurers will be better able to price on the basis of risk in the case of 
cryptocurrency companies. For traditional D&O insurers, the ability to 
accurately identify the risk profiles of their insureds is critical to their ability to 
operate profitably, and being better than their competitors at grading risk gives 
companies a significant competitive advantage.131 Despite these strong 
incentives, however, insurers are not actually very effective at pricing policies on 
the basis of risk. Baker and Griffith lay out a number of factors that lead to poor 
risk-based pricing, including personal incentives and biases of underwriters, 
effects of market competition, and the cyclical nature of the insurance market.132 
That being said, some of these effects will not necessarily apply in the context of 
insurance for ICO companies, at least in the early days when insurers’ regulatory 
influence will be most needed. For example, the minimal competition among 
insurers and lack of established norms in pricing means that insurers will not feel 
pressured to price according to market rather than according to risk level.133 
 
128 While fraudulent behavior would likely be excluded from coverage through a policy’s fraud 
exception, there is also plenty of questionable behavior that may not qualify as outright fraud but is still 
likely to trigger company failure and subsequent lawsuits. See infra text accompanying note 129. 
129 See Boto, supra note 108 (“It is likely that underwriters will need to heavily scrutinise the 
prospective insured’s . . . operations through to the integrity of people involved in the business.”). 
130 Even this modest level of due diligence would have prevented a number of clearly fraudulent 
ICOs from being conducted. For example, Centra, a company endorsed by Floyd Mayweather that 
claimed to be creating a debit card for cryptocurrencies, was created by two twenty-two-year-olds 
with no experience in cryptocurrencies or computer science. The company raised $32 million in its ICO 
and was later revealed to have made up its CEO, lied about its partnerships with Visa and Mastercard, 
and falsely claimed it had a working product. Nathaniel Popper, How Floyd Mayweather Helped Two Young 
Guys from Miami Get Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/technology/
how-floyd-mayweather-helped-two-young-guys-from-miami-get-rich.html [https://perma.cc/V5KF-
22YS]; Sissi Cao, Investors Sue Celeb-Backed ICO: Company Has No Product or CEO, OBSERVER (Dec. 
18, 2017, 5:44 PM), http://observer.com/2017/12/cryptocurrency-startup-centra-tech-sued-by-
investors-over-ico-fraud [https://perma.cc/4MCH-TX2W]. 
131 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 79-80. 
132 Id. at 98-101. 
133 See id. at 99 (“D&O insurers operate in a highly competitive and transparent market. . . . Insurers 
thus have ample opportunity and incentive to adjust their pricing on the basis of market factors that are 
not strictly relevant to the assessment of risk.”). 
234 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 211 
Furthermore, in the context of a publicly traded corporation, the average 
standard of corporate conduct is relatively high and consistent across 
companies. Since companies are required to file extensive reports with 
regulators, send proxy solicitation materials to shareholders, and the like, there 
is a degree of oversight that makes it challenging to get away with the type of 
behavior that could trigger massive liability. This means that there is very little 
variation among companies’ observable risk levels relative to the potential 
liability. Therefore, relatively minor variations in corporate behavior can result 
in huge variations in liability,134 requiring insurers to pick through a company’s 
documents with a fine-tooth comb.135 It is therefore not surprising that 
insurers have trouble deciding which companies are riskier than others. 
On the other hand, startup companies in general, and ICO companies in 
particular, vary wildly in their standards of corporate conduct. Some ICOs are 
conducted by established corporations that follow standard corporate 
governance procedures. Others are conducted by a patchwork of individuals 
and corporate entities,136 “decentralized” organizations,137 nonprofits in 
foreign tax havens,138 and the like. Since large variations in risk level are 
readily observable based on simple factors like corporate governance structure 
(indeed, factors which the insurers may be able to influence to some degree), 
prospective insurers will have some simple heuristics at their disposal which 
may help them separate the safer companies from the riskier ones. They may 
therefore be better able to price discriminate, which in turn will disincentivize 
risky business practices for those companies that seek insurance.139 
Even in the event a traditional D&O insurer is able to effectively price 
according to a company’s risk level, the threat of increased premiums may not 
be sufficient to deter risky behavior. In the context of large public companies 
for example, D&O premiums do not represent a large enough cost to cause 
managers to change their behavior—instead they would rather “simply pay 
their D&O premiums, whatever they are, and continue with business as 
 
134 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 26, at 1424 (“On the other hand, there is substantial 
evidence that insurers are not very confident about their ability to price on risk given that the pricing 
differentials are small in relation to the insured liabilities.”). 
135 Corporate risk managers report that insurers demand a “very thorough review and research 
into the guts of the finance [and] . . . operation of the company,” which can take weeks and involve 
numerous meetings and presentations. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 83. 
136 E.g., supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text (discussing the PlexCorps ICO). 
137 E.g., supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing The DAO’s attempt to conduct 
an ICO as a decentralized entity). 
138 E.g., supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text (describing such an example in the Tezos ICO). 
139 While it is true that there is much less information available about ICO companies generally 
as compared to their traditional corporate counterparts, much of this uncertainty impacts the likelihood 
of success of the venture, rather than its risk of catastrophic liability. Despite the uncertainty of the 
current regulatory environment, there are certainly best practices (such as careful compliance with U.S. 
securities regulations) that, if followed correctly, can greatly reduce the risk of liability. 
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usual.”140 However, the same may not be true for ICO companies. These 
companies are usually small prior to their ICO (which in many cases is the 
company’s first fundraising event) and represent a very high degree of risk 
relative to a publicly traded corporation. Together, these factors are a recipe 
for D&O premiums that are much more expensive relative to the total size of 
the company,141 meaning that managers are more likely to be sensitive to their 
magnitude. Managers at early stage startups are also not generally highly paid 
and receive fewer perquisites; rather, their personal financial success is often 
highly dependent on the success of the company. Therefore, expensive D&O 
premiums are likely to be much more salient to them than to a public company 
CEO, who can shrug these off as merely a cost of business.142 
C. Contract Design 
Third, insurers will be more inclined and able to use aggressive contract 
provisions—including deductibles, coverage limits, and various exclusions—to 
limit the amount of risk they are underwriting.143 The primary purpose of 
deductibles and coverage limits is to ensure that “insurance does not fully 
insulate people from their losses,”144 thereby incentivizing them to limit their 
risk-producing activities. Were it not for these provisions, purchasing 
insurance would allow insureds to cause harm with impunity, so long as the 
harm was within the limits of their policy. In the ICO context, insurers 
looking to reduce risk in what they consider a “very difficult market” are using 
large deductibles—$750,000 or higher—to ensure their insureds are properly 
incentivized to limit their risk-producing activities.145 ICO insurers are also 
using a number of aggressive exclusions—most notably for costs related to 
regulatory proceedings or investigations.146 By implication, companies are 
forced to bear the entire risk of SEC intervention, which is most likely to 
 
140 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 104. 
141 Indeed, from the limited information available about the few existing cryptocurrency 
insurers, this seems to be holding true. See Boto, supra note 108; ICO Seeking D&O?, supra note 24 
(“Due to this small pool of insurers, and the perceived risk associated with such offerings, companies 
should approach the process with high-premium expectations.”). 
142 A startup’s managers are usually its principle shareholders prior to taking on institutional 
capital. This means that a CEO who spends her company’s money on large D&O premiums is in 
essence spending her own money, whereas a public company CEO, who may only own a few percent 
of her company, may not experience the same reticence in engaging in such spending. 
143 These provisions also help to account for the inherent uncertainty that exists in a new 
insurance market, where there are fewer established methods of pricing risk. See, e.g., Talesh, Data 
Breach, supra note 114, at 426 (“Because the cyber insurance market is so new, brokers and 
underwriters struggle with evaluating how to price and evaluate the risk of loss.”). 
144 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 26, at 1420. 
145 ICO Seeking D&O?, supra note 24. 
146 Id. 
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happen as a result of issuing coins that the SEC deems to be securities. In 
conjunction with certain underwriting criteria, these exclusions will help 
ensure that companies err on the safe side of SEC regulations rather than 
hoping to skirt securities regulation altogether. 
D. Education and Risk Management 
Finally, though traditional D&O insurers do not conduct meaningful 
research and education efforts or provide risk management services to 
insureds, the emergent nature of the cryptocurrency industry affords insurers 
a much more significant role to play. A recent analysis of the cyber insurance 
industry147 (also a rapidly emerging area of technology with little precedent) 
found that cyber insurers “actively manag[e] the underlying risk of data 
breach”148 of their policyholders by providing data breach detection and 
prevention services,149 instructional materials and telephone hotlines to help 
policyholders better understand data security laws and best practices,150 and 
access to experienced and prevetted networks of professionals (including IT, 
public relations, and legal counsel) in the event of a data breach.151 
Insurers in the cryptocurrency industry have the opportunity to engage 
in analogous efforts relating to regulatory compliance, financial management 
and growth strategy, and corporate governance. Given the current regulatory 
uncertainty, insurers have the opportunity to engage with public regulators 
to help shape the regulatory landscape, and to bring their expertise in the 
regulatory sphere to their policyholders. Insurers could, for example, provide 
access to experienced attorneys who can advise on whether a proposed coin 
qualifies as a security or myriad other regulatory challenges. 
Insurers could also facilitate business advising related to how much money 
to raise, how to conduct the ICO mechanically, and how to allocate or 
distribute the proceeds of the offering; sound practices in these areas could 
help reduce the riskiness of an offering. And insurers can readily improve 
fledgling ICO companies’ corporate governance—one of the most important 
factors in determining a company’s risk level.152 In the case of traditional 
 
147 Cyber insurance is offered to companies to cover liability resulting from data breach, privacy 
violations, and cyber attacks. This relatively new type of insurance has grown to become very popular 
(around one third of organizations now have it). Talesh, Data Breach, supra note 114, at 419. 
148 Id. at 428. 
149 Examples of these services include analysis of the company’s susceptibility to cyber attacks 
via “cyber health checks,” management of breach detection systems, evaluation of the security practices 
of potential vendors, and establishment of proper procedures in the event of a breach. Id. at 428-30. 
150 Id. at 430-31. 
151 Id. at 432-33. 
152 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 88-89; see also Baker & Griffith, supra note 27, at 516 
(“[T]here are two ‘pillars’ of D&O underwriting: ‘Number one is the financial health of the 
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startup companies, venture capital firms are typically a primary source of 
governance-related information such as the structure of the charter and 
bylaws, board of advisors, and the like. By choosing to raise funds in a 
decentralized manner, ICO companies do not have access to the same advice 
and expertise, leaving an important gap that could be filled by D&O insurers, 
who could either employ such advisors directly or maintain a network of 
advisors that their policyholders could access. Via these advisors, insurers 
could also play a role in promoting a “culture and character” of ethicality—a 
factor that Baker and Griffith report as the single most important component 
of corporate governance-related risk prevention.153 
CONCLUSION 
With the blockchain industry currently in a period of transition—from 
scrappy, decentralized, idealistic upstart, to mainstream component of global 
financial markets and driver of economic growth—companies are being forced 
to shift their strategies from regulatory avoidance to regulatory compliance. 
Many of the theories and ideals on which cryptocurrencies were initially built, 
such as decentralization, independence, and lack of institutional authority, are 
not tenable when aggregating vast amounts of capital and applying it to a 
common enterprise—at least, not at the industry’s current level of 
technological sophistication. With great power comes great responsibility, and 
U.S. regulators have clearly indicated that ICOs demand additional scrutiny 
and new regulatory policies and frameworks in order to manage the abundant 
opportunity for undesirable behavior inherent in the current system. 
In the face of this shifting climate, insurance companies have a unique 
opportunity to help shape the industry’s growth by contributing to its 
ongoing standardization and legitimization. The scarcity of existing options 
and lack of precedent for this type of insurance mean that insurers have 
considerable power to influence their insureds by offering coverage on the 
insurers’ terms. The time has come for blockchain companies to move beyond 
their disreputable past and embrace sound corporate governance practices, 
and insurers can play an important role in catalyzing this maturation process. 
 
 
[company]. Number two is how good that company [is] at governing itself.’” (quoting Tom Baker & 
Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Underwriter #9 at 8 (2005) (unpublished confidential transcripts) 
(on file with Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith))). 
153 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 26, at 88. 
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